How the Fourth Amendment and the
Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall)
Together
Aziz Z. Huq†
This Essay explores an entanglement of ends and means between two seemingly disparate parts of the Constitution: the Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers. Not only do these two elements of the Constitution share a common
ambition; they are also intertwined in practical operation. The vindication of
Fourth Amendment interests, however defined, depends on a measure of institutional differentiation between the branches of government. That predicate, however, has eroded over time. In its absence, difficult questions arise about how Fourth
Amendment values are best implemented and whether their realization will in the
end hinge on private rather than on state action.

INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers are
conventionally viewed as distinct, isolated elements of the Constitution. My aim in this Essay is to show, to the contrary, their
interaction and even interdependence. The Fourth Amendment,
I argue, echoes in purpose, and relies on in practice, the division
of authority between the three branches of the federal government. This institutional predicate of the Fourth Amendment’s
operation with respect to the federal government, however, is
fragile and increasingly unreliable. The ensuing erosion of the
Amendment’s underlying assumptions has implications, I suggest, for the viability of efforts to promote pro-privacy regulatory
agendas under a constitutional aegis, and, as a correlate, it suggests a need to find possible alternative regulatory paths to privacy in new regulatory spaces such as emerging digital and telecommunications domains.
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My focus here departs from mainstream Fourth Amendment
scholarship’s dominant preoccupations. Since the 1960s, the literature has focused on the scope of police authority, especially
regarding the power to conduct vehicular stops and street stopand-frisks, the measure of deference to officer safety during
stops, the need for an exclusionary rule, and the boundary between a diffuse reasonableness trigger for search authority and a
more procedurally onerous warrant requirement. The Supreme
Court’s Fourth Amendment docket in the 2015 term is exemplary
in turning on traffic stops1 and municipal investigations.2
This focus obscures the relationship of the Fourth Amendment to the structure of the federal government. It also means
that the Court typically considers Fourth Amendment questions
concerning novel technologies in litigation about ordinary policing.
The consideration of geolocational technologies and cell phone data in United States v Jones3 and Riley v California,4 for instance,
emerged respectively from narcotics5 and antigang investigations.6
But Fourth Amendment rules tend not to be tailored to specific institutional contexts. They spill over to the federal government’s rather different search capacities.7 Judicial preoccupations peculiar
to the policing and crime-control contexts nevertheless infuse, or
distort, conduct rules and remedies that extend undifferentiated
across distinct institutional contexts.
To be sure, the Fourth Amendment and the separation of
powers have been haphazardly recoupled in the public eye by the
sheer force of recent events. Disclosures of warrantless surveillance by the NSA8 and telephony-metadata collection9 have catalyzed wide-ranging debate on data-collection and surveillance authorities. The separation of powers figured into this debate
1
See generally Rodriguez v United States, 135 S Ct 1609 (2015); Heien v North
Carolina, 135 S Ct 530 (2014).
2
See generally City of Los Angeles, California v Patel, 135 S Ct 2443 (2015).
3
132 S Ct 945 (2012).
4
134 S Ct 2473 (2014).
5
Jones, 132 S Ct at 948.
6
Riley, 134 S Ct at 2480–81. Riley also concerned a drug-related arrest. Id at
2481–82.
7
See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive
Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv L Rev 842, 847 (2001) (describing Fourth Amendment law
as “transsubstantive” because it “applies the same standard” to vastly different types of
crimes).
8
See James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without
Courts (NY Times, Dec 16, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/3JAC-VMML.
9
See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily (The Guardian, June 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/M37P-NYPL.
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because initial administration defenses of surveillance programs
rested on an assertion of plenary Article II authority.10 Such
claims prompted predictable objections11 and defenses based on
constitutional text12 and practice.13 This literature, while informative on its own terms, trains narrowly on the distribution
of power between Article I and Article II. It does not consider
what the Fourth Amendment implies about the distribution of
interbranch authority. Nor does it reflect on the fit between the
institutional assumptions underwriting the Fourth Amendment
and observed institutional behavior.
To be clear, my aim here is not to ascertain whether specific
collection or surveillance programs are lawful or constitutional.
The evaluandum in this Essay is rather the separation of powers
as a device for promoting rights. There is a largely optimistic body
of literature that considers causal links between constitutional
structure and individual liberties. Hence, Professors Nathan
Chapman and Michael McConnell elaborate an account of the
Due Process Clause pursuant to which the “government may not
interfere with established rights without legal authorization and
according to law, with ‘law’ meaning the common law as customarily applied by courts and retrospectively declared by Parliament.”14 In similar terms, Professor Heather Gerken posits
that “the ends of equality and liberty are served by both rights
and structure.”15 I am less certain.16 My aim here is to define

10 See William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Letter to the Honorable
Pat Roberts, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, et al *2–3 (Dec
22, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/B3ZV-YUW2.
11 See, for example, Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 Tex L Rev 1401, 1404 (2010) (arguing that defenders of warrantless surveillance are incorrect because “the President’s capacities are
constitutionally subject to statutory restraint outside of extraordinary and temporally
limited cases”).
12 See, for example, Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 BU L Rev 375, 383–91 (2008) (arguing that the “Vesting Clause thesis
is . . . obviously true” and that “[i]f the Vesting Clause thesis is correct, the Bush Administration’s NSA program as it has been described by the Administration appears to be
lawful”).
13 See generally, for example, Neal Katyal and Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly
Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60
Stan L Rev 1023 (2008) (examining the surveillance activities undertaken by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and their similarities to modern practices).
14 Nathan S. Chapman and Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 Yale L J 1672, 1679 (2012).
15 Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and
Structure, 95 BU L Rev 587, 594 (2015).
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how constitutional structure, viewed ab initio, was intended to
promote a specific right, and to analyze the extent to which this
structure-rights causal nexus remains robust today. By testing
whether constitutional structure does promote Fourth Amendment rights as originally imagined, I hope to move beyond the
relatively abstract and ahistorical causal claims aired in this literature and provide a more grounded case study in constitutional design.
The argument has three steps. Part I maps three pathways
between the Fourth Amendment and the division of interbranch
authority—a common purpose and two common assumptions
about institutional differentiation. Part II considers whether these linkages have withstood the test of time. It finds a lag between
the Fourth Amendment’s aspirational political economy and observed institutional behavior. Part III then draws inferences for
future doctrinal development and privacy-seeking strategies, with
particular attention to how Fourth Amendment values can be
vindicated given aggressive federal collection, analysis, and surveillance efforts regarding electronic communications.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
This Part identifies three pathways between the Fourth
Amendment and the separation of powers. Its aim is to loosely
sketch how rights against unreasonable searches and seizures
might have fit into the larger constitutional architecture and
thereby to articulate a structural account of the Fourth Amendment.17 I contend first that a common purpose animates both elements of the Constitution. Further, I suggest that the practical
operation of Fourth Amendment values assumes two forms of institutional differentiation embedded in the separation of powers.
For each argument, I use text and history as departure points. I
recognize that the Fourth Amendment’s text and history remain

16 See Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 NYU J L & Liberty 1006,
1012 (2014) (“[T]he analysis of structural constitutional design proves only ambiguous
and fragile guidance [as to how to promote normative interests].”).
17 For one explanation of structural arguments, as opposed to other types of constitutional arguments, see Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution
74–92 (Oxford 1982). Professor Philip Bobbitt describes “structural arguments” as “largely factless” and as relying on “inferences from the existence of constitutional structures
and the relationships which the Constitution ordains among these structures.” Id at 74.
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sharply contested.18 Still, I hope my argument rests on tolerably
uncontroversial, shared grounds.
The basic premise of all three points advanced here is commonplace: the Fourth Amendment initially applied to the federal
government alone.19 The Court incorporated protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures against the several states
only in 1949.20 Further, police forces (as the term is employed
today) did not exist in 1791.21 They would not come into existence for another half century.22 As a result, “the ex officio authority of the peace officer was still meager in 1789.”23 The class
of federal officials of the early republic most often invoked as potential violators of the Fourth Amendment comprised naval inspectors exercising statutory authority to search, either with or
without a warrant, for customs violations.24 At the moment of its
entry into legal force, therefore, the Fourth Amendment reached
governmental behavior distinct in scale and topography from its
contemporary analog. Connections to the separation of powers
must be glossed in light of that gap.

18 Compare Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
Mich L Rev 547, 724 (1999) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment was aimed “at banning
Congress from authorizing use of general warrants”), and Telford Taylor, Two Studies in
Constitutional Interpretation 41 (Ohio State 1969) (concluding that “our constitutional
fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about overreaching warrants”), with Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am
Crim L Rev 257, 258 (1984) (describing the “conventional interpretation” of the Fourth
Amendment as including a “warrant requirement” for nearly all searches and seizures).
19 See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale
L J 1131, 1136 (1991) (describing the Bill of Rights as “[o]riginally a set of largely structural guarantees applying only against the federal government”).
20 See Wolf v Colorado, 338 US 25, 27–28 (1949). The Court did not extend the exclusionary rule to the states until 1961. See Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655 (1961).
21 See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L Rev 1165, 1200–07 (1999).
22 See id at 1204. See also Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice 15–
16 (Oxford 2012).
23 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 552 (cited in note 18).
24 See, for example, Act of Mar 3, 1791 § 32, 1 Stat 199, 207 (authorizing the issuance of warrants to customs-enforcement officials to find “fraudulently deposited” spirits); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 757, 766
(1994) (collecting early statutes that allowed customs searches without warrants). See
also Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 623 (1886) (noting that an exemption for customs
inspectors was granted “by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original
amendments to the Constitution,” indicating that “the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable’”).
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Common Purpose

Constitutions—including the US iteration of 1787—strive to
achieve many ends, from the creation of new state infrastructure
to the settlement of regional divides to the fostering of public
goods such as a robust internal economy or national defense.25
Not all unfold in the same time frame. Some may be long-term;
others have closer temporal horizons.26 In consequence, it cannot
be assumed that distinct constitutional provisions, introduced at
different moments in time for different reasons by heterogeneous constituencies, will have the same or congruent ends.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment and the 1787 separation of powers pursue a common end. Trivially, both are concerned with constraining, not empowering, the state.27 More interestingly, they converge on a quite distinct problem of liberal
state building: the avoidance of what Montesquieu called “despoti[sm]”28 and James Madison labeled “tyranny.”29 Both endeavor to raise the costs of attempts by those with political authority to consolidate state power absolutely against
contemporaneous or prospective opponents. The 1787 separation
of powers achieves this end by preserving the platforms from
which opponents and newcomers can sustain their positions in
political competition. The Fourth Amendment, in contrast, focuses on the potential for incumbents to deploy state power to
undermine the persons and reputations of those same opponents. By providing a positive entitlement to platforms for political opposition and a negative entitlement against ill-motivated
efforts to undermine those platforms, these two elements of the
Constitution should work in complementary harmony.
To Montesquieu and Madison, a central task of constitutional design was aversive in character: avoiding concentrations
25 See Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq, What Can Constitutions Do? The Afghan Case,
25 J Dem 116, 120, 127–28 (2014).
26 I have identified elsewhere an intertemporal tension between different ends
sought by the 1787 Constitution. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U Pa L
Rev 1165, 1229 (2014) (identifying elements of a constitution as “temporally sensitive”
due to “exogenous pressures on the nation-state”).
27 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and
the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn L Rev 1325, 1342–43 (2002) (describing
the intent of both the Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers as “limit[ing] executive power and discretion”).
28 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 28–29 (Cambridge 1989) (Anne M. Cohler,
Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone, eds and trans) (originally published 1748).
29 Federalist 47 (Madison), in The Federalist 323, 324 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed).
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of power that might conduce to arbitrary rule. Montesquieu identified despotism with regimes in which “the law must be in a single person[,] and it must change constantly,”30 and he condemned
them as “corrupt by [ ] nature.”31 In response, he pressed the utility of intermediating entities—in particular the judiciary.32 His
cure for despotism thus sounded in institutional heterogeneity.
Elaborating on Montesquieu’s argument, Madison rejected a
complete separation between the branches. Rather, he underscored the French nobleman’s dictum that “where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution, are subverted.”33 Institutional
monopolization of state power, in Madison’s account of the Constitution, was resisted not only by a constitutional design in
which “each department [had] the necessary constitutional
means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the
others”34 but also by the installation of a “double security” of vertical separation between the national and state governments.35
Absent the differentiation of interests across institutions, of
course, neither separation of powers nor federalism would have
an inhibitory effect on despotism. But consistent with his insistence in Federalist 10 on the inevitability of manifold factional
differences across the population,36 Madison’s vision of the separation of powers can be understood as a subsidy to the inevitable
political opposition that arises in an extended, heterogeneous
republic. This subsidy is meant to be a hedge against despotism
and tyranny.
The Fourth Amendment advances the same end via different means. To see this, start with the two English cases that
provided focal points as negative precedent in the ratification

30

Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws at 126 (cited in note 28).
Id at 119.
32 See Roger Boesche, Fearing Monarchs and Merchants: Montesquieu’s Two Theories of Despotism, 43 W Polit Q 741, 747 (1990).
33 Federalist 47 (Madison) at 325–26 (cited in note 29).
34 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (cited in note 29).
35 Id at 351.
36 Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist 56, 58 (cited in note 29) (“The latent
causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where
brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil
society.”).
31
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debates:37 civil actions by John Entick and John Wilkes, both
opposition English politicians, against agents of Lord Halifax,
the secretary of state.38
Both Entick and Wilkes were targeted due to their political
oppositional activities, in particular publications critical of the
Earl of Bute’s regime.39 Explaining the legal questions in Entick’s
suit, the presiding judge Lord Camden focused not on a flaw in
the warrant but rather on the impermissibility of “paper
search[es].”40 Papers, he explained, are a person’s “dearest property[,] and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will
hardly bear an inspection.”41
As Professor William Stuntz has elegantly argued, the rule
of Entick v Carrington42 and Wilkes v Wood43—a rule against paper searches—had almost no bearing on the investigation of ordinary crimes in an era wanting for organized police, when citizens would make accusations and often effect arrests; it rather
imposed a constraint on “political crime[s].”44 In the eighteenth
century, only senior government officials would have men at
their disposal to search homes. A number of these searches
would likely target papers implicating some kind of opposition to
regnant powers.45 Seditious libel prosecutions of this sort, with
attendant investigations involving “general searches for documentary evidence,” had been common under King Charles I.46 The
Fourth Amendment, to the extent it drew inspiration and purpose
from these cases, was thus “really about the protection of political
dissent.”47 In other words, it was about maintaining space for individuals to compete for offices created by the separation of

37 See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale
L J 393, 396–404 (1995); Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 772 (cited in note 24); Davies, 98
Mich L Rev at 563 n 21, 657–59 (cited in note 18).
38 See Stuntz, 105 Yale L J at 397 (cited in note 37).
39
See id at 397–99. See also Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J
Crim L & Crimin 49, 61–62 (2013) (describing how Wilkes’s publications specifically targeted Bute and King George III).
40 Entick v Carrington, 19 Howell’s St Trials 1029, 1073 (CP 1765).
41 Id at 1066.
42 19 Howell’s St Trials 1029 (CP 1765).
43 19 Howell’s St Trials 1153 (CP 1763).
44 Stuntz, 105 Yale L J at 402 (cited in note 37).
45 See id at 402–04.
46 Andrew E. Taslitz, Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment: A History of Search
and Seizure, 1789–1868 18 (NYU 2006).
47 Stuntz, 105 Yale L J at 447 (cited in note 37).
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powers system—individuals who might play vital roles in resisting incipient despotism.
B.

Two Forms of Institutional Differentiation

There is no such thing as a purely private paper or thing.
Nothing, as a matter of law, lies categorically beyond the state’s
panoptic gaze. But it was not always so. In its “first significant
case involving the fourth amendment,”48 the Court held in Boyd
v United States49 that any “seizure of a man’s private books and
papers” would violate the Fourth Amendment (as well as the
Fifth Amendment).50 Boyd rooted this absolute protection of private papers in a law office history of Wilkes.51 The ensuing class
of “private” papers that could be neither seized by government
agents nor secured by subpoena endured, at least in theory, until Boyd’s repudiation in 1976.52 Periodic calls for the revival of
the Boyd rule aside,53 the Court itself currently evinces no appetite for trying to circumscribe some domain of absolutely private
papers or things that under no circumstances can be elicited by
the state.
But if the Fourth Amendment does not create a zone of unbreachable privacy, what does it do?54 The Amendment does not
entirely prohibit the government from engaging in searches or
seizures—this much is evident from the adjective “unreasonable.” Rather, the Amendment has generally been read as circumscribing the conditions under which such actions are lawful.55 In textual terms, the reasonableness of a search does not
depend on its object or what it happens to discover but rather on
the manner in which the government behaves. The Fourth

48 Samuel A. Alito Jr, Documents and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 48 U
Pitt L Rev 27, 39 (1986).
49 116 US 616 (1886).
50 Id at 633.
51 See id at 625–26.
52 See Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 407–09 (1976). Fisher reserved the question whether a personal diary might receive different treatment. Id at 401 n 7.
53 See, for example, Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers,
71 Va L Rev 869, 873–74 (1985) (describing the Boyd Court’s interpretation of Entick as
“more accurate” than later interpretations).
54 See Andrei Marmor, What Is the Right to Privacy?, 43 Phil & Pub Aff 3, 7 (2015)
(identifying the primary interest at stake in the privacy debate as “the interest in having
a reasonable measure of control over ways in which we present ourselves to others”).
55 See, for example, Boyd, 116 US at 622 (noting that “long usage, acquiesced in by
the courts,” might legitimize a given search or seizure by suggesting that there must be
“plausible ground or reason for it in the law, or in the historical facts”).
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Amendment here diverges from other parts of the Bill of Rights,
such as the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment, which seem to be absolute prohibitions.56 It rather
tracks the Takings Clause. This does not on its face reject all
government confiscations but rather requires compensation and
imposes limitations on the subsequent use of property.57 Like the
Takings Clause, the Fourth Amendment assigns a price to the
(coercive) work of statecraft.
The Fourth Amendment’s labor, though, operates along a
subtly different margin from the Takings Clause’s. The former
entails a careful division of institutional labor between all three
branches, whereas the latter imposes a liability rule of just compensation without specifying its institutional underpinnings.58
The executive, of course, is implicated because it is the object of
Fourth Amendment regulation. Treating that as a given, I examine here first its implicit allocation of labor to legislators and then
its mandate for judicial action to show the Fourth Amendment’s
double functional dependence on the separation of powers.
1. Congress and the Fourth Amendment.
A world apart from the First Amendment’s gimlet-eyed stance
toward legislators, the Fourth Amendment deploys Congress as a
means to further individual interests. Consider the Warrant
Clause, which imposes “probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation” as a condition antecedent to the issuance of a warrant.59
The text supplies no referent for probable cause. But it is tolerably
clear that a certainty that agents “will find something in a house—
walls, for example— . . . cannot suffice to support an ex parte warrant.”60 As a post-Wilkes pamphleteer explained, an officer must
possess probable cause respecting the presence of “stolen goods, or
such a particular thing that is criminal in itself . . . before any
56

US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”) (emphasis added).
US Const Amend V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
58 It is natural, but erroneous, to assume that it is the courts’ role to assess and order just compensation; legislatures are capable of issuing compensation without judges’
prompting. And the judiciary, as much as the legislature and the executive, is capable of
Takings Clause violations. See, for example, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 US 702, 714 (2010) (“Our precedents
provide no support for the proposition that takings effected by the judicial branch are
entitled to special treatment, and in fact suggest the contrary.”). For these reasons, the
Takings Clause lacks the Fourth Amendment’s distinctive institutional logic.
59 US Const Amend IV.
60 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 766 (cited in note 24).
57
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magistrate is authorized to grant a warrant to any man to enter
[a] house and seize it.”61 The reference to probable cause, in short,
is an incorporation by reference of substantive criminal law.
Congress accordingly enters the Fourth Amendment equation as a source of rules that calibrate search authority under
warrants.62 A legislature concerned about executive abuse of
search authority can narrow criminal liability to rein in the executive. A legislature lacking this concern, but worried about fiscal goals, can alternatively recruit inspectors and vest them
with authority to engage in searches of vessels and homes for illegally imported goods.63 Of course, not all search authority
turns on warrants. But at least until recently, the Court has
construed the authority to search or seize without a warrant in
the case of felony arrests,64 vehicular searches,65 or street-level
stops66 as keyed to the scope of substantive criminal law.
The Fourth Amendment’s allocation to Congress of the power to calibrate search authority has two advantages. It first diffuses control over a key element of government power between
two branches. Second, it amplifies democratic control over such
authority. From this perspective, Stuntz’s near-canonical objection to constitutional criminal procedure—that Congress can
take away whatever the Court gives in the form of procedural
rights by ratcheting up the severity and scope of substantive
criminal law67—inverts the anticipated constitutional design.
The Fourth Amendment’s democratic pedigree is more consistent with the provision’s central antityranny purpose than
Stuntz’s analysis might imply.

61 Schnapper, 71 Va L Rev at 903 (cited in note 53), quoting Father of Candor, A
Letter concerning Libels, Warrants and the Seizure of Papers 58 (London 5th ed 1765).
62 See Ku, 86 Minn L Rev at 1326 (cited in note 27).
63 See note 24 and accompanying text.
64 See, for example, United States v Watson, 423 US 411, 423–24 (1976) (declining
to adopt a constitutional rule requiring warrants when it is not “practicable” to procure
one during an arrest).
65 See, for example, Carroll v United States, 267 US 132, 155 (1925) (“[I]f an officer
seizes an automobile . . . without a warrant . . . the officer may escape costs or a suit for
damages by a showing that he had reasonable or probable cause for the seizure.”).
66 See, for example, Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 30 (1968) (permitting a police officer to
conduct “a carefully limited search of the outer clothing” of a person if the officer “observes unusual conduct” indicating that “criminal activity may be afoot”).
67 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L J 1, 56 (1997).
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There are two important caveats to this point. First, during
the first decade of the republic, there was a “muddled”68 and
highly politicized69 debate about whether a federal common law
of crime existed. Riding circuit in 1798, Justice Samuel Chase
rejected nonlegislative crime.70 Fourteen years later, the whole
Supreme Court in United States v Hudson and Goodwin71 followed suit, holding that the “legislative authority of the Union
must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”72
To rely solely on Hudson and Goodwin to show that criminal prohibitions required legislative action would, I think, be
evasive. After all, prior to 1812, eight circuit courts had upheld
convictions secured through common-law federal crimes.73 These
judges may have been operating according to presumptions that
had been ousted by the 1787 Constitution. But the logic of constitutional architecture is not so airtight or inexorable that elements of a repudiated ancient regime cannot survive, or even
fester, as purported constitutional backdrops.
A more modest defense of my argument avoids prochronic
feints. It holds that even assuming a federal common law of
crime existed in 1791, Congress was hardly shut out of the picture. It likely remained to Congress to abrogate or alter commonlaw crimes. Even absent a role in fashioning common-law
crimes, Congress still held the whip hand over state search authority between 1791 and 1812.
The second caveat operates not as a limitation on my observation about the structural predicates of the Fourth Amendment but
instead as an indictment of recent doctrinal developments. Since
1967, the Court has recognized a gamut of exceptions to both the
warrant rule and any individuated-suspicion requirement in a

68 Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the
Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 L & Hist Rev 223, 263 (1986).
69 See Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and
the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw U L Rev 26, 68 (1978) (“Other
commentators on the political dispute which was soon to develop over the existence of a
federal common law of crimes attribute the division of opinion to the broader Federalist/
Republican split over the extent of powers that the Constitution granted to the central
government.”).
70 See United States v Worrall, 2 US (2 Dall) 384, 388 (1798).
71 11 US (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
72 Id at 34.
73 Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the
Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 Yale L
J 919, 920 n 8 (1992) (collecting cases in which common-law crimes were upheld).
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series of cases now denominated “administrative search jurisprudence.”74 So, for example, police can establish witness checkpoints on highways without a scintilla of legislative authorization.75 (Foreign-intelligence investigations are another exception,
requiring no necessary link to a predicate crime.)76 Abandonment of individuated suspicion corresponds to a derogation of
any necessary legislative role of the kind that the Framers anticipated. Administrative search doctrine in particular has been
comprehensively critiqued on other grounds, but it surely counts
as a strike against that jurisprudence that it disregards what
has long been a keystone element in the Amendment’s institutional logic—a tight nexus to legislative authorization.77
2. Courts and the Fourth Amendment.
To contemporary ears, an inquiry into the judicial function
in Fourth Amendment law is no less than an inquiry into the
much-maligned exclusionary rule of Mapp v Ohio78 (imposed, albeit in federal prosecutions, forty-seven years beforehand79). But
even in the absence of an exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment in practical operation necessitates institutional differentiation between the executive and judiciary. Before the exclusionary rule’s advent, therefore, courts were already necessary
institutional channels of Fourth Amendment values.
The judicial role emerges in the Warrant Clause. To be sure,
just as the text is silent as to the object of probable cause, so too it
is silent on the identity of the constitutionally proper person to issue a warrant. But as glossed by the Court, the Clause implies institutional differentiation between “the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” and “a neutral
74 See, for example, Camara v Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 US 523, 538 (1967) (concluding that area inspections for the purpose of enforcing municipal programs satisfy the criminal law standard of “probable cause” and do not
violate the Fourth Amendment as long as “reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied”).
75 See Illinois v Lidster, 540 US 419, 427 (2004) (deeming a checkpoint stop constitutional because it “interfered only minimally with liberty of the sort the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect”).
76 See, for example, 50 USC § 1805(a)(2)(A) (providing special exceptions for electronic surveillance if “the target . . . is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”).
77 Narcotics and alcohol checkpoints are loosely justified by legislative action in the
sense that laws exist regulating controlled substances. But this is not the kind of tight
nexus required by the probable cause requirement.
78 367 US 643, 651 (1961).
79 See Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 398 (1914).
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and detached magistrate.”80 Article III courts have the authority
to issue warrants notwithstanding the ex parte character of
those proceedings.81 But not all warrants need to be issued by
Article III judges, provided that the magistrate possesses the
“neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer.”82 In
practice, this entails institutional separation.83
This illuminates the otherwise rather puzzling result in
Shadwick v City of Tampa,84 in which the Court upheld an ordinance authorizing arrest warrants issued by nonlawyer court
clerks for breaches of municipal ordinances.85 Shadwick explained that the Fourth Amendment insists that “someone independent of the police and prosecution must determine probable
cause”86 and looked to the institutional locus of the clerks rather
than to their training or tenure.87 For this reason, a non–Article
III magistrate judge can issue a warrant,88 whereas an FBI special agent in charge, however competent, legalistic, and dispassionate, is disqualified by her presumptive “partiality, or affiliation,”89 with the investigating officers.
The Warrant Clause, in short, rejects a purely endogenous
solution to the problem of ensuring regularity and legality within investigative agencies. It repudiates what administrative law
scholars call “internal separation of powers” solutions for checking and diffusing government power.90 Such solutions involve intermural “administrative structures and other mechanisms” to
promote due process, “regularity[,] and the rule of law”91 in a
“fractal”92 effort to re-create within a branch structures that
might otherwise operate between the branches.

80

Johnson v United States, 333 US 10, 14 (1948).
See Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 681 n 20 (1988).
82 Lo-Ji Sales, Inc v New York, 442 US 319, 326 (1979).
83 See id at 327 (determining that there was no “neutral and detached posture”
when the town justice that issued the search warrant constructively became a member of
the police operation).
84 407 US 345 (1972).
85 Id at 352–54.
86 Id at 348.
87 Id at 349–50.
88 FRCrP 41(b).
89 Shadwick, 407 US at 350.
90 See, for example, Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L J 423, 427–28 (2009).
91 Id at 429.
92 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev
865, 898 (2007).
81
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The second judicial function within the institutional architecture of the Fourth Amendment cannot be drawn directly from
the Amendment’s text. Instead, it must be derived from the assumptions and beliefs that animated its incorporation into the
Constitution. On Professor Akhil Amar’s account, the anticipated remedial mechanism for Fourth Amendment violations was a
civil tort action for damages, in which an officer’s liability would
be ascertained by a jury.93 To substantiate this claim, Amar
identifies “strong linkages between the Fourth and Seventh
Amendments,”94 with Entick and Wilkes as key exhibits.95 Indeed, seizures by federal revenue officials in the early republic
were challenged in common-law forms of action such as trover,
detinue, and assumpsit.96 Such suits were brought in either
state or federal courts.97 But given that the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial in civil cases had been motivated in
part by Anti-Federalist concerns about unchecked federal official
action,98 it seems plausible to think that some measure of institutional differentiation within the federal government was inferred from the expected operation of the Fourth Amendment.
C.

Structural Implications of the Fourth Amendment

Constitutional rights have different shapes: in Hohfeldian
terms,99 the Fourth Amendment is an individual right with a
correlative duty on the state regarding the forms of permissible
searches and seizures. The duty, rather than being substantive,
has a structural, procedural declension. The Fourth Amendment
is vindicated not by governmental disavowal of search authority
but instead by assiduous observance of interbranch protocols. As
befits a constitutional protection aligned in purpose with the
separation of powers’ antityrannical ambition, the Amendment
is cashed out by the involvement of multiple, clearly differentiated branches as conditions precedent to invasions on a person’s

93

Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 758 (cited in note 24).
Id at 775.
95 Id at 775–77.
96 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One
Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 66 (Yale 2012).
97 See id at 73.
98 See id at 67–68.
99 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L J 16, 30 (1913) (setting forth an influential taxonomy of
eight correlatives and opposites that structure legal relationships).
94
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sphere of protected interests. The Fourth Amendment as originally conceived rested on structural armatures.
II. TESTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S STRUCTURAL
IMPLICATIONS
But how have those foundations held up over time? This
Part uses contemporary examples to illuminate interactions now
between the Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers.
These examples are drawn from the domain of federal nationalsecurity-related surveillance, collection, and regulatory activities. The underlying hypothesis to be tested turns on whether fidelity to the separation of powers can indeed promote valued
constitutional rights and individual liberties.
I offer a caveat first: The analysis presented here might be
taken as endorsing a standard ambition in constitutional theory
to “translate”100 the Fourth Amendment into contemporary contexts or to maintain an original “equilibrium.”101 But I am uncertain whether these metaphors enable perspicacious judgment—
here, or ever. The sheer number of variables that have changed
between 1791 and today means that it is hard to discern what a
sound translation or equilibrium would be or how successful
translations or equilibriums can be distinguished from failures.
The sheer scale of the expected social benefit from local and
state governments, and from the federal government, has
changed rather dramatically over time, but at different rates.
How can an invariant Fourth Amendment rule covering all of
them possibly embody and preserve a singular 1791 equilibrium? The range of human interests covered by the Fourth
Amendment has also proliferated. Changes to domestic architecture and familial domiciliary arrangements, for example, have
altered both the expectations and the possibilities of intimacy.
Novel diversity in the permitted forms of sociability engender
new interests. The advent of electronic surveillance, algorithmic
data mining, and geolocational technology merely accentuates
the wide variance in privacy interests. Hence, Professor Judith
Jarvis Thomson’s famous complaint about the miscellaneous
character of privacy102 resonates as a critique of the Fourth
100 Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
Stan L Rev 395, 443 (1995).
101 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
Harv L Rev 476, 487 (2011).
102 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 Phil & Pub Aff 295, 312–13 (1975).
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Amendment’s scope and as a reprimand to mechanical notions of
translation or equilibrium.
My goal here, instead, is more narrow than translation. It is
to ask whether the anticipated causal mechanisms and effects
associated with the Fourth Amendment continue to be observed
today. The examples considered below document different elements of the contemporary interbranch division of labor as a
way of testing the durability of the Founding-era assumptions.
They are not fabular exercises in the academy’s just-so stories of
translation or equilibrium.
A.

A Domesticated Fourth Amendment?

The antityranny purpose of the Fourth Amendment finds
exiguous echo in contemporary practice and doctrine. Viewed in
the round, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence no longer treats
dissenters (however defined) as the cynosure of constitutional
protection. Rather, the overall structure of Fourth Amendment
doctrine prioritizes a very different species of privacy.
To see this, consider who might be the closest contemporary
analog to Wilkes. It is plausible (if not inevitable) to posit leakers such as Edward Snowden and their abettors at The Guardian and The New York Times as the closest parallels today: political insiders who rebelled in ways that other political insiders
find morally and legally repugnant.103 Recent practice, though,
suggests that the federal government can be aggressive in investigating leakers and their abetting correspondents when it wishes to do so, and that the Fourth Amendment would provide very
little shelter for either. This is in part because the instruments
used to conduct such investigations, such as requests for call records and subpoenas,104 are weakly regulated under the Constitution. The attorney general’s guidelines titrating the use of subpoenas against news organizations stipulate that an order to produce
information must be “essential” to a criminal investigation or

103 Is Snowden unlike Wilkes in that he was a government insider who betrayed a
trust? Wilkes was also an insider (a member of parliament when North Briton No. 45
was published), protesting what he saw as the most iniquitous policies of the day. See
Radical Newspaper: The North Briton No. 45 (British Library), archived at
http://perma.cc/ZHR2-8L5V. Contemporary skepticism of Snowden among policy and legal elites, therefore, seems at least to me somewhat more probative of the historical parallel than disqualifying.
104 See, for example, Charlie Savage and Leslie Kaufman, Phone Records of Journalists Seized by U.S. (NY Times, May 13, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/EJG8-E9A2.
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prosecution.105 Given that in many cases a journalist’s records
may be the sole place in which information about a leaker can be
found, it is not clear how demanding this standard will prove in
practice.106
As a matter of Fourth Amendment doctrine, political dissenters also receive less protection than that afforded to suspects in more-routine investigations. The 1972 case United
States v United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan107 (“Keith”) rejected warrantless searches that were directed at a group of domestic political dissenters.108 But the
Court invoked difficulties faced by investigators in domesticsecurity investigations to hold that the constitutionally adequate
warrant procedure “may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving
protection.”109 Domestic-security cases could be channeled to
specially constituted courts and regulated by less onerous timing
and reporting rules. This “warrant lite” regime is potentially
less protective than the post–World War II executive branch
practice of permitting warrantless searches provided that their
yield was not used in criminal prosecutions.110 Congress has
never taken up Keith’s invitation. The Keith opinion’s separate
exception for foreign-power-related investigations,111 it turns out,
has generated quite enough leeway.
Rather, if there is a bias in contemporary Fourth Amendment
law, it runs in quite a different direction. In Keith itself, Justice
Lewis Powell adverted to “physical entry of the home [as] the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed.”112 More generally, “the home [is] a sacred site at the

105

28 CFR § 50.10(c)(4)(ii)(A).
Efforts to subpoena former New York Times reporter James Risen persisted for
several years before Attorney General Eric Holder terminated them. See Matt Apuzzo,
Holder Fortifies Protection of News Media’s Phone Records, Notes or Emails (NY Times,
Jan 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LAC6-H83U. Given the seeming centrality of
Holder’s views on journalistic freedom to the decision here, it is not clear that any general trend can be inferred from this decision.
107 407 US 297 (1972).
108 Id at 321.
109 Id at 323.
110 See L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment’s National Security Exception: Its
History and Limits, 66 Vand L Rev 1343, 1392–95 (2013).
111 Keith, 407 US at 321–22 (“We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to,
the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their
agents.”).
112 Id at 313.
106
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‘core of the Fourth Amendment’” across an array of situations.113
In spite of its political, structural roots, the Fourth Amendment
has transformed into a nostalgia subsidy for home ownership.114
This transmigration of a public-regarding concept into a vindication of the cozily private is not unique. There is a little-noticed
parallel between the Fourth Amendment’s domestication and
the subsequent taming of the Second Amendment in District of
Columbia v Heller.115 The Second Amendment emerged from
“conceptions of republican political order” that conduced to “ordinary citizens participat[ing] in the process of law enforcement
and defense of liberty.”116 Heller, however, reworked that right
into one that is narrowly gauged around self-defense.117 There is
no small irony in the fact that perhaps the two most antistatist,
centrifugal constitutional elements of the Bill of Rights have
been rendered nullities on their original terms by domestication.
B.

Congress as the Ally of Fourth Amendment Interests?

Well-trodden examples illustrate how legislators are only
weakly incentivized to vindicate Fourth Amendment values. The
recent legislative response to Snowden’s disclosures, for example,
was “hardly resist[ed]” by the NSA because it would entail merely
“modest” changes to ongoing collection efforts.118 Similarly, the
disclosures of warrantless bulk collection of domestic-to-foreign
calls in 2005 resulted in new authorizations for bulk collection
and retroactive immunity for telecommunications providers.119
Even the much-hymned Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978120 (FISA) has glaring lacunae.121
113 Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the
Fourth Amendment, 95 Cornell L Rev 905, 913 (2010), quoting Wilson v Layne, 526 US
603, 612 (1999).
114 See Stern, 95 Cornell L Rev at 919–20 (cited in note 113).
115 554 US 570 (2008).
116 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L J 637,
650 (1989).
117 Heller, 554 US at 599–600.
118 Peter Baker and David E. Sanger, Why the N.S.A. Isn’t Howling over Restrictions
(NY Times, May 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4S6R-J8S5.
119 See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436, codified as
amended in various sections of Titles 8, 18, and 50. This Act did extend a warrant rule to
acquisitions targeting US persons overseas for the first time. FISA Amendments Act
§ 101(a)(2), 122 Stat at 2448–53, codified at 50 USC § 1881b.
120 Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified as amended in various sections of Titles
18 and 50.
121 For example, FISA has an “exclusive means” provision, but this provision extends to
only “electronic surveillance.” 50 USC § 1812(b). The latter’s statutory definition, however,
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The threadbare quality of legislative incentives cannot be
explained merely by Congress’s prioritization of security over
privacy interests. Consider a less well-trodden example. Today,
the usage of digital devices and services generates large volumes
of by-product transactional, locational, and interactional data.122
These data can be used to generate novel and surprising inferences about individual traits, behaviors, and affiliations.123
While the epistemic utility of aggregated data amenable to algorithmic analysis has stimulated considerable debate about the
third-party doctrine of Smith v Maryland,124 few have noticed
that data-rich intermediaries already have powerful incentives
to share such data with the government voluntarily, not least
due to cyberattacks by other sovereign actors.125 Bills proposed
in recent sessions of Congress and supported by major telecommunications carriers would deregulate information sharing between companies and the federal government, substantially
lowering the cost of mass disclosures to the government.126 Recent iterations of these bills not only permit but affirmatively
require real-time sharing of data received by the Department of
Homeland Security with the NSA.127 The bills place no constraints on how data may be used. If the expansive and creative

trains largely on wire communications inside the United States, leaving satellite and
other forms of transmission unregulated. See 50 USC § 1801(f). Federal legislation commonly known as the Wiretap Act has been amended to include a savings clause that
permits certain nonstatutory collection of nondomestic communications. Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Wiretap Act”) § 802, Pub L No 90351, 82 Stat 211, 212–23, codified as amended at 18 USC §§ 2510–20; 18 USC
§ 2511(2)(f).
122 See Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data
and Control Your World 13–19 (Norton 2015).
123 See, for example, Jones, 132 S Ct at 956 (Sotomayor concurring) (describing GPS
monitoring as “making available at a relatively low cost [ ] a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion,
chooses to track”).
124 442 US 735 (1979). See also, for example, Jones, 132 S Ct at 957 (Sotomayor concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
125 See generally Shane Harris, @War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex
(Houghton Mifflin 2014).
126 See, for example, Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S 2105, 112th Cong, 2d Sess (Feb
14, 2012).
127 See, for example, Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, HR 234, 114th
Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 8, 2015); Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014, S 2588,
113th Cong, 2d Sess (July 10, 2014). See also Kurt Opsahl, The CISPA Government Access Loophole (Electronic Frontier Foundation, Mar 1, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/N8JH-V6PM.
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gloss placed on FISA’s “tangible things” provision128 or the deep
cooperation between the Drug Enforcement Administration and
AT&T in the Hemisphere Project129 is any guide, such provisions
will function as cheaper access channels for large data flows that
otherwise would be regulated by warrants or administrative
subpoenas.
The strong legislative support for such measures suggests
that Congress cannot be assumed to act as a friction on executive ambition even absent direct national-security concerns. Indeed, in contrast to legislative attitudes, the White House has
promulgated an executive order with relatively robust privacy
protections.130 This is not the sole pro-privacy posture struck by
unexpected elements of the executive: In the early 2000s, the
NSA endorsed robust cryptography and network-security algorithms, thereby ensuring their “wider availability in nonclassified settings.”131 When the NSA was revealed to have corrupted commercial cryptography standards, another agency of
the federal government, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, issued an advisory against the flawed algorithms.132
And one of the leading antisurveillance tools available today, the
Tor network, was originally developed with the support of the
US Naval Research Laboratory.133 Hence, even if Congress is
routinely (if not inevitably134) privacy blind, security-focused elements of the executive can be quite solicitous of the same value.
Elementary public-choice analysis suggests not that these
anecdotes will be outliers but rather that congressional production of privacy protections will generally be weak, especially in

128

50 USC § 1861.
See Scott Shane and Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.’s (NY Times, Sept 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4QYD-QZZR.
130 See Executive Order 13691, 80 Fed Reg 9349, 9350–51 (2015) (“Agencies shall
coordinate their activities under this order with their senior agency officials for privacy
and civil liberties and ensure that appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties
are incorporated into such activities.”).
131 Susan Landau, Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-Sector Telecommunications Infrastructure, 7 J Natl Sec L & Pol 411, 428–29 (2014).
132 See id at 430–31.
133 See Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA’s War on Internet Security (Spiegel Online International, Dec 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YGC4-X8ER.
134 See, for example, Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Wide Overhaul of Wiretap Laws
(NY Times, May 7, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/U9TH-2A9Y (describing some
lawmakers as “express[ing] skepticism” about expanding wiretap laws to make it easier
to conduct surveillance on Internet users).
129
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the national-security domain.135 Many forms of surveillance have
small effects that are diffused across the population. Consequently, they are unlikely to generate effective interest group
formation. Even when government exploitation of vulnerabilities
engenders possible criminal exploitation of the same weaknesses,136 the risk of economic loss lies generally in the future, uncertain in distribution and magnitude, and highly discounted. To be
sure, there is a minority (roughly one-quarter) of the population
that highly values privacy,137 but (as I explain below) this minority may find the purchase of private substitutes easier than public collective action.
On the other hand, even though the harms combatted by
national-security institutions in particular are uncertain and
distant, they are vividly pressed by a powerful and prestigious
legislative lobby—our law-enforcement and national-security
agencies. The latter are especially influential among legislators
because they shape the factual agenda for debate by determining
how much information to share with Congress. The lawenforcement lobby, as the cybersecurity-information-sharing debate suggests, will also often align with influential telecommunications lobbies, whose financial interests are often conducive to
the maximizing of individuals’ disclosures and tight cooperation
with the government on both cybersecurity and regulation.138
Privacy legislation—on the sporadic occasions that it is enacted—already reflects this asymmetrical political economy
through the “universal[ ]” inclusion of “law enforcement access
to covered material, relying chiefly on more complex devices

135 See Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 Va L Rev 1435,
1502–03 (2013) (summarizing public-choice theory).
136 Susan Landau, Surveillance or Security? The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping
Technologies 182–88 (MIT 2010).
137 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv L
Rev 2010, 2026 (2013).
138 See Landau, 7 J Natl Sec L & Pol at 423–25 (cited in note 131) (describing congressional support for the industry position of weaker export controls on cryptography
against the FBI’s campaign for stronger controls). It is also true that leading telecommunications firms also sometimes resist regulation. After Snowden’s revelations, Apple
and Google introduced default Secure Sockets Layer encryption to their mobile operating
systems, and WhatsApp integrated TextSecure into the app. But these developments
would impose no friction if those companies were to disclose information directly to the
state. See Sean Gallagher, Web Giants Encrypt Their Services—but Leaks Remain (Ars
Technica, June 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/QH72-DC95; Lily Hay Newman,
WhatsApp Is the First Major Messaging Service to Add Strong End-to-End Encryption
(Slate, Nov 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LBZ9-YVV3.
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than a warrant and probable cause.”139 More generally, Congress’s modal solution to the challenges of political disagreement
and technical deficiencies involves delegation under broad
standards, which—perhaps uniquely in this domain—re-creates
the perceived problems of open-ended discretion rather than resolving them. No less than in the criminal law domain, in which
legislators have spent most of the past decade bidding up penal
sentences,140 Congress is unlikely to be a constant Fourth
Amendment ally in new technological fields.
C.

The Fragile Judicial Role

Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has evinced
an increasing unwillingness to enforce the Fourth Amendment
at the cost of forgoing criminal convictions. Instead, it has required rights holders to show not merely that an act was unlawful but also that it was especially egregious.141 I have argued
elsewhere that this lack of concern flows not just from judges’
ideological preferences but also from a sense of the institutional
interests of the Article III judiciary.142 This is a threshold reason
to have only a tempered hope for the judiciary.
It would be surprising indeed if the judicial attitude became
more latitudinarian when national-security concerns were in
play.143 Experience with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) supports this inference.144 Since 2003, the FISC,
139 Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information
Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111
Mich L Rev 485, 491 (2013).
140 See, for example, Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich L Rev 1843, 1844
(2004) (describing “the renewed interest of the police in traffic enforcement [as] attributable to a federally sponsored initiative related to the war on drugs”) (quotation marks
omitted).
141 See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional
Remedies, 65 Duke L J 1, 20 (2015) (“Since the mid-1970s, the Court has rationed the
availability of [damages, suppression, and habeas relief] by installing a threshold requirement that individual rights claimants must typically demonstrate that an offending
state official not only violated the Constitution, but did so in an especially flagrant and
obvious way.”).
142 See id at 55 (“This historical evidence is complemented by a growing body of evidence that judges act upon the basis of institutional interests determined by their position within Article III.”).
143 In fact, courts’ approaches to remedies for constitutional violations do not change
significantly between national-security and nonsecurity contexts. See Aziz Z. Huq,
Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 S Ct Rev 225, 257.
144 I am skeptical that the concerns expressed in the Jones concurrences and in the
Riley majority opinion about third-party collection will yield a meaningful friction on
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which is tasked with approving foreign-intelligence wiretaps, has
approved more than 97 percent of requests without modification.145
Of course, high grant rates alone might be explained by the
presence of administrative systems that are capable of crafting
lawful warrants, anticipating problems, and negotiating solutions. But the FISC has also promulgated relatively broad glosses on collection authority146 while weakening constraints on interagency dissemination147 and resisting proposals to introduce
adversarial elements into the warrant process.148
Further, even if the anticipatory effect of judicial oversight
explains grant rates in the FISC, this may be due less to judicial
action than to a sort of quasi-internal separation of powers, including a large, lawyer-staffed compliance apparatus in the DOJ
and a pool of former government lawyers operating as “longterm lawyer assistants” to FISC judges.149 In effect, the government has developed an “iterative”150 process of processing and controlling that is more characteristic of bureaucratic rationality than
of judicial oversight. To the extent that programs like the NSA’s
bulk metadata collection have not generated abusive practices,
this may be evidence that an internal separation of powers of the
sort that the Fourth Amendment’s drafters rejected may in fact
have some traction. On the other hand, it may also be that such
internal controls are only as reliable as the political leadership of

state collection efforts. I do not think the Court is well positioned to craft a rule of general application for (1) the many different kinds of governmental entities that collect and
hold third-party data and (2) the many different ways in which different kinds of thirdparty data can be used, especially given the endless ways in which different databases
can be aggregated to de-anonymize and describe individuals. The Court lacks the political will to engage in a sustained campaign of regulation. In my view, it is likely to install
a reasonableness rule rather than a warrant requirement.
145 See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, 37 Harv J L & Pub Pol 757, 831 (2014).
146 See generally In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2014 WL 5463290 (FISC).
147 See Charlie Savage and Laura Poitras, How a Court Secretly Evolved, Extending
U.S. Spies’ Reach (NY Times, Mar 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KBA9-QCYS
(noting that the FISC order “significantly changed” prior procedures by allowing agencies “to share unfiltered personal information”).
148 See Honorable John D. Bates, Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Letter to the Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary *2–5 (Aug 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/478U-RP37 (opposing the creation of a special advocate position in the FISC).
149 Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil
Liberties Gap, 6 Harv Natl Sec J 112, 152–53, 165 (2015).
150 Id at 164.
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a given administration wishes them to be, such that they are effective only when they are the least needful.
***
There is a telling response offered to critics of the NSA’s
bulk metadata collection that characterizes the program not as
an executive frolic but rather as an effort vetted by all three
branches.151 Regardless of what one thinks of bulk collection, the
response is suggestive of a wider institutional condition. To the
extent that the Framers anticipated that either Congress or the
federal judiciary would be a vigilant guardian of Fourth
Amendment values, their expectations about institutional incentives have not been met. Neither of the Fourth Amendment’s institutional mechanisms works as intended, largely due to institutional officeholders’ weak incentives regarding rights-related
ends. This erosion in the institutional predicates of Fourth
Amendment enforcement is certainly not the sole reason for the
observed fragility of constitutional privacy today, but it is likely
one explanation for privacy’s current limited reach.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REDIVIVUS?
Given the erosion of the Fourth Amendment’s institutional
infrastructure, debates about whether Congress or the courts
are better at vindicating privacy might be better abandoned in
favor of alternative, more-profitable inquiries. The institutionalallocation question, pursued lately by Professors Orin Kerr152
and Erin Murphy,153 has yielded no obvious clear answers—only
stalemate. Rather, a new Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (if
such a thing were even feasible) would, in my view, begin by
drawing new distinctions and attending to alternatives to hallowed institutional pathways. In what follows, I sketch a possible doctrinal approach—albeit in skeletal and suggestive form—
paying particular attention to problems related to electronic
151 See David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J Natl Sec L &
Pol 209, 213–23 (2014) (outlining the process of the bulk telephony-metadata collection
program).
152 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich L Rev 801 (2004) (calling for legislative, rather than judicial, regulation of criminal investigations in a quickly changing
technological context).
153 See Murphy, 111 Mich L Rev at 537–38 (cited in note 139) (suggesting interbranch cooperation by “draw[ing] on the relative strengths” of the judiciary and Congress
to better regulate policing).
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communications and large aggregates of third-party data. At
bottom, however, I am skeptical that these reforms will see the
light of day. Ultimately, it is more likely that privacy allocations
will reflect underlying distributions in socioeconomic (and hence
political) power.
Consider first some possible reforms. Here, it is useful to
start from the observation that the acquisition and the use of information by the federal government look starkly different from
states’ and localities’ parallel activities. States and localities are
(all else being equal) more focused on ordinary crime control.
Predictive algorithmic instruments are already deployed by urban police to identify crime hot spots and to make deployment
decisions within regularized and bureaucratic “strategic control
systems” (known as CompStat).154 Given the efficacy of
CompStat and hot spot policing,155 expansions of local police departments’ authority to exploit pools of electronic data (for example, telecommunications data and social media) might decrease the need for more intrusive and violent measures such as
stings, undercover officers, and informants. If such gains come
tethered to other costs,156 both the magnitude and the distribution of such costs as well as associated benefits at this local level
will be distinct and different from the costs that are associated
with the federal government’s exploitation of similar data. To
analyze both local and national actors through the same lens—
as the Court is wont to do157—therefore seems to me to be unwise
and distorting. The Fourth Amendment, in short, would benefit
from a healthy dose of federalism.
Regarding the federal government, I reject as implausible
the aspiration that aggregate data collection and analysis be
terminated. So long as private companies engage in such activities (and can profitably vend their output to the state) and foreign-state competitors race to secure both defensive and offensive tools,158 the federal government will not exit its business of

154 David Weisburd, et al, Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem
Solving in American Policing, 2 Crimin & Pub Pol 421, 426 (2003).
155 See Anthony A. Braga, The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime, 578 Annals
Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 104, 113–19 (2001) (observing crime reductions in seven of nine
hot spot–policing studies).
156 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion,
163 U Pa L Rev 327, 398–404 (2015).
157 See Stuntz, 114 Harv L Rev at 847 (cited in note 7).
158 See, for example, Bill Marczak, et al, China’s Great Cannon (Citizen Lab, Apr 10,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5HZL-36V2.
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data aggregation and analysis. Moreover, that business will
evolve in accord with the dictates of strategic, geopolitical forces—not endogenous legal concerns. To the extent that Fourth
Amendment law trains exclusively on the act of acquiring information or penetrating a private space, it is merely gestural.
Instead, it is worth considering whether the harms identified with data-driven surveillance necessarily arise from “putative violations of privacy” or rather from “an additional concern
about the possibility of abuse of the information obtained.”159
Leading clarion calls against electronic surveillance prominently
adumbrate the former concern, not the latter.160 Intuitively, this
resonates: When a person is seized by police in the course of a
street or vehicular encounter, triggering the Fourth Amendment, dignitary and emotional harms can accrue immediately,
even absent violence. But there is no parallel to such contact
harms in the use of electronic data. This may counsel for moreexpansive and more-careful minimization and use procedures,
matters that are now allocated to the reticulated backwaters of
FISA warrant design.161 Whether such dissemination and use
restrictions are ranked as a Fourth Amendment rule or are
merely good practice seems to me to be distinctly less important
than the considerable difficulties of implementation.
The political economy analysis of Part II suggests, nevertheless, that reforms of this kind are unlikely to emerge from our
current democratic and judicial arrangements. Instead, those
still fervently concerned about privacy per se will likely be
forced to seek solutions outside the state. Like the residents of
Baltimore’s Mondawmin neighborhood,162 citizens can resort to
self-help to restore the balance of power between themselves and
the state. At least in the communications domain, this means
deploying universal encryption and anonymizing technologies
such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), a protocol for securing bidirectional data tunnels; Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a program

159

Marmor, 43 Phil & Pub Aff at 15–16 (cited in note 54).
See, for example, Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 Harv L Rev
1934, 1935 (2013) (describing surveillance as harmful because it “chill[s] the exercise of
our civil liberties” and alters “the power dynamic between the watcher and the
watched”).
161 See 50 USC § 1861(g)(1) (requiring the attorney general to “adopt specific minimization procedures” for the acquisition of “tangible things”). See also Kris, 7 J Natl Sec
L & Pol at 237–41 (cited in note 151).
162 See Scott Shane, Baltimore Riots Are Another Scar on a City Long Battered by
Neglect (NY Times, Apr 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/278Y-UP7G.
160
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for encrypting and signing messages; Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC), a set of specifications for authenticating domain names; Tor, a program for anonymity; and fulldisk encryption (FDE), an approach to protecting hardware.163
Although SSL and PGP are free (and based on robust opensource code), in practice operationalizing universal encryption is
“difficult and expensive.”164 Self-help in the electroniccommunication-privacy domain thus selects for those with adequate technical skills or resources to purchase access to those
skills. Similarly, privacy against algorithmic exploitation of bulk
noncontent data (for example, telecommunications metadata
and financial records) is best secured by bespoke, and hence expensive, arrangements in which secrecy from both the provider
and the government is assured.165 Privacy, in short, is on the
road to becoming “a [p]remium [s]ervice,”166 acquired only by
those with technical knowledge or economic resources.167
This suggests that the last redoubt of privacy, self-help
against state exploitation of electronic data, will likely have
sharp regressive effects. Whether this is desirable depends on
your views of distributive justice. If privacy in the electronicdata domain does trend in this direction, however, it will at least
yield a sort of consistency. For, as Professor Stuntz acutely observed more than a decade and a half ago, the distribution of
privacy in our domesticated Fourth Amendment already “makes
wealthier suspects better off than they otherwise would be, and
may make poorer suspects worse off.”168
It is for this reason that I conclude that the Internet, big data, and new forms of communicative technology are unlikely to
generate new liberties. They likely will instead reproduce and
163 See Nicholas Weaver, Our Government Has Weaponized the Internet. Here’s How
They Did It (Wired, Nov 13, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/GF6V-8AFZ.
164 Id.
165 It is possible that Hillary Clinton’s use of a private server during her tenure as
secretary of state may have been intended as such an arrangement. See Michael S.
Schmidt, No Copies of Clinton Emails on Server, Lawyer Says (NY Times, Mar 27, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/339G-3J4P. Of course, I mean to take no position on the various controversies raging around her practice, and I merely use the example as one that
involves an expensive bespoke security arrangement.
166 David Auerbach, Privacy Is Becoming a Premium Service (Slate, Mar 31, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/S99U-JT8L.
167 At the same time, the privatization of privacy is likely to peel away critical elements of potentially effective interest groups, raising the cost of legislative mobilization.
See Part II.B.
168 William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo Wash
L Rev 1265, 1266 (1999).
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entrench extant hierarchies. And as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence shifts in faltering and uncertain increments from the
streets to the cloud, it too will likely reflect with uncanny fidelity
our divided, unequal, and irremediably unjust social order.169

169 See Louis Michael Seidman, Making the Best of Fourth Amendment Law: A
Comment on The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo Wash L Rev 1296,
1296 (1999) (“Our mainstream constitutional tradition has a deep bias toward status quo
distributions of wealth and power.”).

